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Most empirical work on Congressional elections implicitly assumes that candidates are vote-
maximizers.  While this may be a fair assumption for challengers, it is not a good description of
incumbent behavior.  I present a general intertemporal utility maximizing model of candidate
behavior, which includes vote-maximization as a special case.  I then demonstrate that these




Empirical research on Congress often consists of making inferences about the importance
of institutions or events based upon comparisons of the vote-getting or fund-raising success of
candidates for office.  Recent examples of this are seen in the research on the electoral effects of
incumbency (Levitt and Wolfram, 1997), campaign spending [Levitt (1994) and Gerber (1998)],
committee assignments ( Milyo, 1997b) and scandals [Jacobson and Dimock (1994) and
Groseclose and Krehbiel, (1994)], as well studies of the fund-raising value of committee
assignments [Grier and Munger (1991a,b), Milyo (1997b) and Crain and Sullivan (1997)].  This
work has its genesis in Mayhew’s (1974) description of incumbents as motivated by reelection
concerns;  this “electoral connection” is typically implemented through the implicit assumption
that candidates maximize their vote-shares.
The assumption that incumbents are primarily motivated by re-election concerns has
proven fruitful for the understanding of both the behavior of legislators and the workings of
legislative institutions [Mayhew (1974) and Fenno (1978)].  However, in the context of most
empirical work, the notion that incumbents are primarily motivated by re-election is one thing, the
assumption that all candidates for elective office seek to maximize their vote-shares is quite
another.  I argue that the assumption of vote maximization drives the design and interpretation of
empirical work to an extent which is neither appreciated nor intended.Many studies have documented the existence of “ideological slack” in the voting behavior
1
of incumbents [Figlio (1995) and Bender and Lott (1996)].  However, to the extent that voters
are largely ignorant about the details of their representative’s voting record, the existence of
ideological slack is not necessarily inconsistent with the assumption of vote-maximization.
For more discussion of this, see Gerber (1998), Levitt (1994), Ansolabehere and Snyder
2
(1996) and Milyo (1998).
The predictions of pure vote-maximizing behavior are easily falsified by the existence of
voluntary departures from office, candidate savings and debt, predictable changes in savings and
debt, and the apparent ability of candidates to “crank up” effort in response to adverse
circumstances.   A more general intertemporal utility maximizing model of incumbent behavior
1
can explain these circumstances and still incorporate the essence of the electoral connection. 
However, this more general approach renders suspect prior empirical work on the electoral effects
of incumbency, committee assignments, scandals and campaign spending, as well as the fund-
raising value of committee-assignments.
I argue that incumbents are intertemporal utility maximizers, but that challengers can be
viewed as simple vote-maximizers.  This is because so many incumbents do not face serious
competition for their seats.  Consequently, there is more potential for incumbents to “slack off”
with little in the way of damaging consequences.  However, this behavior does have important
consequences for empirical work on elections.  Incumbent effort is not easily observed or
measured, so it will be treated as a latent or unobserved variable.  However, this confounds the
omitted variable bias which has plagued the literature on the electoral effects of campaign
spending.   Further, to the extent that most incumbents have slack effort, the effects of
2
incumbency, committee assignments or scandals may not be clearly or completely manifested in
observable variables, such as incumbent vote share or campaign finances.  Beyond implying that
existing estimates of the electoral effects of incumbent advantage, scandals, etc. are probablyDeviations from vote-maximizing behavior may occur for non-selfish reasons, as well. 
3
For example, according to Hillary Rodham Clinton, even while running for re-election in 1996,
President Clinton still found time to minister to a troubled young person.
2
understated, this means that recent evidence which has been interpreted to mean that electoral
effects of marginal campaign spending are essentially nil (Levitt, 1994 and Milyo, 1998), may be
instead simply uninformative on this point.
This paper proceeds in several sections.  I first present some descriptive statistics which
motivate the claim that incumbents are intertemporal utility maximizers.  Next I present a simple
model of this behavior, which includes vote maximization as a special case.  I then argue that
while incumbents are best viewed as intertemporal utility maximizers, it may be fair to model
challengers as simple vote maximizers.  Finally, I show how the choice of model affects the
interpretation of empirical work.
2.  Evidence of Slack in the Electoral Connection
It is quite easy to demonstrate that candidates engage in behavior which is difficult to
reconcile with pure vote-maximization.  For example, former Representative Dan Rostenkowski
(D-IL, 1959 - 1993) was known to use his campaign treasury as a personal slush fund;  Senator
Carol Moseley-Braun (D- IL) has been accused of the same.  But evidence of slack in the
electoral connection is not limited to anecdotes about politicians from Chicago.
3
Recent changes to campaign finance law provide the context for further evidence that
politicians willingly sacrifice electoral security for other ends.  Prior to 1980, House incumbents
were permitted to convert excess campaign funds to personal use.  A 1979 amendment to the
Federal Election Campaign Act ended this practice, but also permitted incumbents elected prior toHall and Van Howelling (1995) criticize this finding, but Milyo (1997a) finds strong
4
corroboration for it.
However, see the discussion of the 1992 House bank scandal, in section six, below.
5
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1980 to convert excess funds upon their retirement from the House.  This “grandfather” clause
was eliminated in by a subsequent amendment in 1989, but did not become effective until after
1992.  Groseclose and Krehbiel (1994) demonstrate that many incumbents retired rather than
forfeit these funds.   However, financial gain is not the only reason for departures from Congress.
4
In general, voluntary departure from office is based upon the incumbent’s expectation of
reelection prospects (e.g., Groseclose and Krehbiel, 1994).  Such departures are extreme
examples of slack effort (giving up).  But this forward-looking behavior has an immediate
implication for the empirical study of elections; the existence of voluntary departures implies that
the sample of incumbents running for re-election is non-random.  Consequently, findings of
empirical studies which ignore this source of sample selection must be understood as conditional
on the incumbent’s choice to run for re-election.  However, since departures from Congress are
typically few in number for any given election cycle, this source of sample selection bias is
probably not a major factor in most contexts.
5
Analogous to the example of incumbent retirements is the decision of potential challengers
whether to run (or of opposition party leaders whether to field a candidate) against an incumbent. 
It is well-known that weak incumbents are more likely to face a challenger or a high quality
challenger [Jacobson (1989) and Banks and Kiewiet (1989)].  This implies that potential
challengers are also forward looking and that many potential high quality challengers exhibit slack
effort by not even challenging an incumbent.  For example, from 1984 to 1992, 10% of HouseInformation on the presence and quality of challengers is compiled from two series, the
6
Almanac of American Politics and Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.




incumbents were unopposed in their re-election bids and another 5% faced only a minor party
challenger.  Further, only 13% of House incumbents faced a challenger with prior political
experience.
6
The fact that most incumbents do not face serious competition for their seats raises
concerns about slack in incumbent effort toward vote-getting and fund-raising activities.  This is
important because it is so common for researchers to measure the importance of legislative
institutions (incumbency, committee assignments, etc.) or events (scandals, roll-call votes, etc.) by
their impact on incumbent electoral success or campaign finances.  However, most incumbents are
probably not exerting full potential effort at vote-getting or fund-raising.  If candidate effort could
be easily observed, this would mean only that the researcher has one more endogenous variable to
incorporate into a model of candidate behavior.  But since candidate effort is difficult to quantify,
it is an omitted variable in extant literature on Congressional elections.
But is there much reason to fret about the existence of slack effort in incumbent vote-
getting or fund-raising?  Consider the evidence in Table One, which lists the mean real campaign
receipts (R) and savings (S) of incumbents, and how these vary by the incumbents’ vote shares
(V).   It is apparent from even these descriptive statistics that incumbents exert more effort toward
7
fund-raising and allocate more funds toward re-election when they find themselves in a tight race. 
The mean campaign receipts of incumbents who are defeated (V<.50) is about 50% greater than
the mean receipts for all incumbents.   This is despite the fact that defeated incumbents5
presumably have fewer institutional advantages for raising money (tenure, prime committee
assignments, leadership positions, etc.).  To the extent that these other factors are time invariant,
they can be controlled for by examining changes in incumbent receipts.  Table One shows that
defeated incumbents increased their receipts by an average of a quarter-million dollars, or more
than five times the average increase in receipts for all incumbents running for reelection.  This is
consistent with the notion that incumbents “crank up” their fund-raising effort in the face of tough
competition, though it might also be evidence that contributors strongly prefer to give funds to
candidates that have a greater need (of course, these two possibilities are not mutually exclusive).
The evidence in Table One also shows that incumbents in tighter races end the election
cycle with a smaller stock of campaign savings (S);  for example, losing incumbents have mean
savings of $518, or about 270 times less than the mean for all incumbents.  Similarly, the flow of
campaign savings (S-S ) differs by the competitiveness of incumbents’ re-election battles.  On -1
average, losing incumbents dis-save over $50,000, compared to a mean flow of savings of
$35,000 for all incumbents.  This suggests that incumbents build up a stock of savings in order to
smooth their fund-raising efforts over time.
From these descriptive statistics it is apparent that when incumbents find themselves in a
tight race for re-election, they exert more effort at fund-raising and allocate more funds to
campaign spending (hence vote-getting).  Consequently, incumbents do engage in some sort of
intertemporal maximizing behavior.  However, this still begs the question as to why anyone
should care.
3.  A Model of Candidate Behavior6
In this section I develop a simple model of candidate behavior.  In its most general form,
candidates are intertemporal utility maximizers;  as a special case of the model, candidates are
vote-maximizers.  I take as given that the candidate being modeled is already running for office,
so ignore all questions about candidate selection and retirement (challenger selection is discussed
in the next section).  I also assume that the candidate is running against a single opponent and that
neither the quality nor the spending of this opponent is a choice variable for the candidate being
modeled.  For simplicity, the campaign is compressed into a single period, so that the candidate
simultaneously chooses the optimizing levels of all choice variables.  These simplifying
assumptions are fairly common (though usually implicit) in empirical studies of Congressional
elections, but beyond consistency, they serve to highlight the different implications of modeling









S  = War Chest -1
CE = Challenger Expenditures7
Q = Challenger Quality
In empirical studies of elections, it is typically assumed that the candidate’s share of the
two-party vote is a good proxy for electoral security.  This is not necessarily so, nor an
assumption necessary to this modeling approach.  However, again for the sake of simplicity and
consistency with the existing literature, I assume that electoral security can be measured by vote
share.  Consequently, I use the terms “electoral security,” “vote” and “vote share” all
interchangeably.
A Simple Model of Utility Maximizing Behavior:
Assume that utility is additively separable across time periods so that the candidate’s
utility function can be represented as the sum of current period utility (U ) and the continuation
0
value of savings (U ).  The candidate’s utility maximizing problem can then be described as:
1
(3.1) Maximize Utility:  U = U (V,L) + U (S)
0 1
Subject to:
(3.2) Electoral Constraint:   V = V(E,L,CE,Q,a,b)
(3.3) Budget Constraint: E = R + S  - S -1
(3.4) Fund-Raising Constraint: R = R(V,L,a,c)
The choice variables are V, L and S;  the optimal values of E and R are then defined by the
optimal choice of V, L and S.  The lower case variables (a, b, and c) represent exogenous8
determinants of the candidates’ electoral success and/or fund-raising;  these exogenous
determinants can include attributes of the candidate (personality, incumbency, committee
assignments, etc.) or the district (conservative-leaning, etc.).  Assume that V >0, V >0, R >0 and a b a
R >0. c
Assume that the candidate derives utility from electoral security and savings (U > 0 and V
U >0), but that effort generates disutility (U <0).  Further, assume that campaign expenditures S L
and effort increase vote share (V > 0 and V >0), while effort also increase fund raising (R > 0).   E L L
Consequently, in this model, a candidate trades effort (L) for campaign funds (R) and electoral
security (V);  campaign funds are then either saved (S) to purchase electoral security in the future
or spent (E) to increase electoral security in the present.
Finally, assume that a unique (internal) solution to the utility maximizing problem exists
such that:
(3.5) V* = V(a,b,c,S ,Q,CE), L* = L(a,b,c,S ,Q,CE) and S* = S(a,b,c,S ,Q,CE ) -1  -1  -1
Further, since expenditures and receipts are functions of the choice variables, these solutions
imply that:
(3.6) E* = E(a,b,c,S ,Q,CE) and R* = R(a,b,c,S ,Q,CE) -1  -1 
If challenger quality and expenditures were exogenously determined, then the expressions
in (3.5-6) would constitute the reduced forms for the dependent variables in this system.  While it9
is common in empirical studies of elections to assume that either or both of these variables are
exogenous, this is not consistent with either the model above or rational behavior on the part of
challengers.
First, notice that in (3.6), expenditures are a function of candidate “quality” (a,b,c,S ), so -1
for consistency, we should expect challenger expenditures to be a function of challenger quality. 
Consequently, let CE = CE(Q).  Now the solution to the candidate’s utility maximization problem
is:
(3.7) V* = V(a,b,c,S ,Q), L* = L(a,b,c,S ,Q) and S* = S(a,b,c,S ,Q) -1  -1  -1 
This in turn implies:
(3.8) E* = E(a,b,c,S ,Q) and R* = R(a,b,c,S ,Q) -1  -1 
The reduced forms in (3.7-8) incorporate the common assumption that challenger quality
is exogenous, but the existing empirical literature rarely treats S as a choice variable, and never
treats L as a choice variable.  Thus the models of candidate behavior implicit in most empirical
work on elections are more restrictive cases of the model articulated here. 
Special Case One:  Pure Vote Maximization
Let “vote-maximization” describe the case where L and S are fixed; that is:  L* = L  and 0
S* = S  = 0.  While the mere existence of candidate savings and debt plainly contradict the -110
assumptions of this model, it’s efficacy should be judged by its predictive ability.  Further, this
model should not be summarily dismissed, since it is the most common model employed in
empirical studies of elections and campaign finance.
Special Case Two: Intertemporal Vote Maximization
In this case, let only L be fixed, so that:  L* = L .  This is essentially the model employed 0
in Milyo (1997a,b).  However, even this slight deviation from vote maximization will have
important implications for the design and interpretation of empirical work.
4.  The Presence and Quality of Challengers
The general utility maximization model described above is most applicable to an
incumbent candidate, since those candidates have the greatest opportunity to slack off.  Below, I
elaborate on the presence and quality of challengers to an incumbent.  A challenger’s
maximization problem can be modeled in the same fashion as above, but I will discuss only the
challenger’s choice to run.  An implication of this selection process will be that all challengers
endorsed by a major party exert maximum effort.  In other words, challengers are vote-
maximizers.
The Pool of Potential Challengers
First define “challenger quality” (Q) as the ability to win votes and raise funds.  Note that
Q is not a choice variable for the individual.   Second, assume that potential challengers decides
whether to run by solving the incumbent’s maximization problem and examining their likelyOf course, parties support candidates beyond mere endorsements.  Further, parties do not
8
support all candidates equally;  they systematically favor candidates in close races.  To incorporate
this into the model above, assume that party support is itself a function of V*(Q). 
11
success.  That is, each potential challenger calculates V*(Q).  Further, assume that in making this
calculation, the challenger assumes that she is exerting maximum effort and that she has the
backing of a major party.  If V*(Q) exceeds some threshold,  then the challenger announces that
she is willing to run.  Next, assume that this threshold is positively related to Q, so that high
quality challengers are more selective.  This embodies the notion that high quality challengers
have higher opportunity costs of running for election.  But this also implies that the size and
average quality of the pool of willing challengers is inversely related to the incumbent’s reelection
prospects.
Major Party Support
Assume that the opposition party chooses the highest quality candidate from this pool,
then makes its own decision whether to support that candidate.  This decision is made based upon
their calculation of V*(Q), again, conditional on maximum effort by the candidate.  As before, if
V*(Q) exceeds some threshhold level, then the party endorses the highest qualified candidate. 
Finally, assume that the candidate and the party are able to contract, so that if endorsed, a
candidate must exert maximum effort.
8
Minor Party Candidates
  Finally, assume that potential challengers who are not chosen by a major party re-
evaluate their electoral prospects and decide to run as independents or minor party candidates. In studies of the determinants of the presence of challengers it is also commonplace to
9
assume that the incumbent’s previous vote share (V ) or war chest (S ) affects whether -1 -1
challengers to step forward.  However, neither of these lagged dependent variables are reasonable
candidates for x.  First, the war chest is itself a determinant of V*, so can not be a true exogenous
determinant of Q.  Second, to the extent that there are unobserved fixed effects in the
determination of vote share, V  will be correlated with V. -1
12
Consequently, there is a direct correspondence between the electoral prospects of an incumbent
and whether the incumbent is unopposed, opposed, or opposed by a major party candidate. 
Implications for the Model of Candidate Behavior:
The discussion above implies that challenger quality is itself a function of the incumbent’s
electoral prospects.  Assume that: Q = Q(V*, x), where x is a true exogenous determinant of
challenger quality.  Examples of such exogenous determinants might be state regulations on
candidate qualifications (filing fees) or determinants of the size of the pool of challengers (lawyers
per capita, etc.).   An immediate consequence of this assumption is that the reduced form
9
solutions to the candidate’s utility maximization problem are now:
(4.1)   V* = V(a,b,c,S ,x), L* = L(a,b,c,S ,x) and S* = S(a,b,c,S ,x) -1  -1  -1 
which in turn imply that:
(4.2) E* = E(a,b,c,S ,x), R* = R(a,b,c,S ,x), CE*=CE(a,b,c,S ,x) and Q=Q(a,b,c,S ,x) -1  -1  -1 -1
Consequently, reduced form estimates of candidate vote share, expenditures, receipts, savings, or
challenger expenditures or quality should include all exogenous factors from both the incumbent’s13
full maximization problem and the selection process for challengers.
5.  Implications of Utility Maximizing versus Vote Maximizing Behavior
Below I provide five examples which demonstrate that the choice to model incumbents as
vote maximizers or utility maximizers has important implications for the design and interpretation
of empirical work.  In order to highlight the effects of these assumptions, I now suppress all
references to challenger quality and challenger expenditures.
The first two examples discuss the identification and estimation of the direct effect of one
endogenous variable on another.  Consequently, these two examples focus entirely on the
problems with structural estimation and how these problems are exacerbated by slack in
incumbent effort.  The remaining three examples focus on the electoral and financial effects of
shocks to exogenous variables.  The direct effects of such shocks can be measured directly
through structural estimation, which again raises the problem of identification.  However, these
examples focus on the estimation of net effects of exogenous shocks from reduced forms.  Here
the existence of slack effort may mask the observable effects of shocks;  this is because the
primary net effect may be realize in unobservable incumbent effort.
Example One:  Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending
Several studies attempt to identify and estimate the direct effect of candidate expenditures
on candidate vote share.  This exercise amounts to estimating the parameters of the electoral
constraint.  For simplicity, assume that the electoral constraint is linear.  I now compare the
implications for this structural estimation under each model of candidate behavior:Green and Krasno (1988) use lagged expenditures (E ) as an instrument for incumbent
10
-1
expenditures.  However, in the presence of unobserved fixed effects, lagged dependent variables
are a function of u.  Consequently, E  is not a valid instrument for E (see Levitt, 1994).  -1
14
1)  Vote Maximization:
V = constant + V *a + V *b + V *E + u a b E
E = R
R = R(V,a,c)
Let u represent a random disturbance term; therefore,  u is also a determinant of V.  In this
case, optimal expenditures can be expressed as a function of (a,b,c,u), since by substitution E =
R(V,a,c).  Consequently, E is correlated with u and ordinary least squares estimation of V  will be E
biased.  Fortunately, an instrumental variable exists;  c is a determinant of R, but not V.  In
instrumental variables estimation, essentially E(a,b,c) is substituted for E(a,b,c,u);  in this way VE
is identified and can be estimated.
10
This is the approach taken by Gerber (1998) and Ansolabehere and Snyder (1996).  The
latter employ candidate wealth, committee assignments, and war chests as instruments for
candidate spending.  Their argument is precisely that these variables are direct determinants of
fund-raising but not vote share.  Gerber uses spending totals for the Republican (Democratic)
candidate in the off year Senate election as an instrument for spending by the Republican
(Democratic) candidate in the current Senate election.  This is a valid instrument if it proxies for
some state-party specific determinant of fund-raising.  Under the vote maximization hypothesis,
any exogenous determinant of fund-raising will be an instrumental variable for the vote equation.Gerber (1998) rejects the incumbent war chest variable as an instrument; he finds that it
11
does not perform well as a determinant of incumbent expenditures (also, see Milyo, 1998).
15
2) Intertemporal Vote Maximization:
Given intertemporal vote-maximization, the three constraint functions/structural equations
now are:
V =  constant + V *a + V *b + V *E + u a b E
E = R + S  - S -1
R = R(V,a,c)
Now, E can be expressed as E=E(a,b,c,S ,u), since substitution yields: E = R(V,a,c) + S  - S.  -1 -1
Once again, E is correlated with u.  However, now both c and S  can play the role of instrumental -1
variables; essentially, E(a,b,c,S ) is substituted for E(a,b,c,S ,u).  Again, this is a tactic used by -1 -1
Ansolabehere and Snyder (1996).
11
One caveat must be added:  S is an endogenous “leakage” in the relationship between
candidate receipts and expenditures.  Some candidates may have higher propensities to save than
others (the continuation value of savings may vary systematically across candidates).  For
example, incumbents with large war chests probably have a greater propensity to save (hence their
large war chests).  This suggests that differences in the instrumental variables may not translate
into the same level of expenditures for all candidates.  In fact, candidates with high electoral
security may choose to save most or all of the extra funds attributable to the instrumental
variables (c, S ).  The existence of this savings “leakage” confounds the search for valid -116
instruments; even if one can find a significant and direct determinant of campaign receipts, this
variable may not be a significant determinant of increased expenditures. 
3) Intertemporal Utility Maximization
In the general model, the prospects for instrumental variable estimation of V  are more E
grim.  Now, both expenditures and effort are functions of the exogenous parameters (a,b,c,S ,u).  -1
Further, absent a proxy for candidate effort, this variable will be an omitted variable in the
structural equation of interest:
V =  constant + V *a + V *b + V *E + (V *L +  u) a b E L
The error term is now (V *L +  u), so the instrumental variables employed by Gerber (1998) and L
Ansolabehere and Snyder (1996) are no longer valid.  This is because (c, S ) are correlated with -1
the omitted variable portion of the error term, since L=L(a,b,c,S ,u). -1
Therefore one important implication of intertemporal utility-maximizing behavior is that
any attempt to estimate the direct effect of candidate spending on vote share must control for
candidate effort.  Consequently, recent attempts to identify the direct effect of campaign spending
on candidate vote share employ instrumental variables which are valid only under the special cases
of pure vote-maximization and (perhaps) intertemporal vote-maximization.  If the general model
is a better description of reality than these special cases, then empirical researchers must find
reasonable proxies for unobserved effort.
  
Example Two:  Are Campaign Contributions Interested?17
In the candidate’s maximization problem, no assumption was made about the sign of R ;  V
this is because theory does not dictate whether an incumbent’s campaign receipts should increase
or decrease with changes in vote share.  For example, it is possible that partisan contributors rally
to support incumbents in danger of losing their seats, implying that R <0.  However, it is also V
possible that interest groups donate primarily to incumbents who are expected to remain in office
(Snyder, 1990 and 1992), implying that R >0.  The question as to whether contributors are more V
partisan or interested can be answered by estimating the structural equation for incumbent
receipts.
Consider the structural equation for incumbent fund-raising.  Assume that candidates
maximize vote share and, as before, assume a linear specification, so that:
V = V(E,a,b)
E = R
R = constant + R *a + R *c + R *V + u a c V
Now, V is a function of u.  However, since b determines V and but does not directly
influence R, it can be used as an instrumental variable for V.  Examples of instruments for V might
include scandals, redistricting, controversial roll call votes or exogenous determinants of
challenger quality.
   However, as in the case above, if the incumbent maximizes utility, then incumbent effort
is an unobserved endogenous variable in this equation.  Since the optimal value of L is a function
of all exogenous variables in the system, there is exogenous variable in this system which can18
instrument for V and not be correlated with unobserved effort.
Example Three:  The Electoral Effects of Scandals
It is commonly assumed that political scandals have a direct and negative impact on
candidate vote shares.  For example, Jacobson and Dimock (1994) find that incumbents involved
in the House Bank scandal were more likely to retire, which is consistent with the notion that
scandals reduce vote share.  However, Jacobson and Dimock found no effects of the scandal in
the vote shares of incumbents that did not retire.  Given pure vote maximization, this is a puzzle: 
if there were no electoral ramifications from the scandal, then why did incumbents retire?
One answer is that there were differential effects from the scandal, and those incumbents
who were most damaged chose to retire.  Therefore, the sample of incumbents that do not retire
is selected in such a way that the observable effects of the scandal are mitigated.  This explanation
contradicts the pure vote maximizing assumption, but is a logical implication of intertemporal
utility maximizing behavior.  However, this mechanism alone does not explain why there should
be no observable effect whatsoever.  I demonstrate below, that under either form of intertemporal
maximization, the effects of a scandal may not be realized in reduced-form estimates of vote-share
(even when ignoring the sample selection explanation).
Suppose that a scandal is essentially a decrease in vote-getting ability, but that scandals
have no direct effect on fund-raising ability.  I will now consider the effects of a shock to an
exogenous determinant of the vote share equation under each of the three models.  In order to
highlight the path of the shock, I adopt a derivative notation.
1) Pure Vote Maximization:19
First, substitute the optimal solutions into the electoral budget and fund-raising
constraints.  Next, differentiate the structural equations with respect to b, so that:
(dV/db) = V *(dE/db) + V E b
(dE/db) = (dR/db)
(dR/db) = R *(dV/db) V
The direct effect of the scandal is represented by the partial derivative, V  .  However, the b
net effects of the scandal can be measured by any of the partial total derivatives, (dV/db), (dE/db),
or (dR/db).  In general, the direct effect of the scandal can be measured only by estimating the
structural equation for vote share.  As shown in the first example, this can be accomplished fairly
easily under the assumption of vote maximization, since plausible instruments for E do exist.  The
net effect of a scandal is most directly estimated from the reduced-form expressions for the
dependent variables.  In this case the net effect of a scandal may be described in terms of vote
share or campaign dollars.  Finally, notice that the net effect of a scandal may either understate or
exaggerate that direct effect;  this is because the scandal affects vote share, which in turn may
increase or decrease receipts (depending on the sign of R ), which then feeds back into the vote V
share equation.
2.  Intertemporal Vote Maximization
 As before, substitute and differentiate with respect to b, so that: 20
(dV/db) = V *(dE/db) + V   E b
(dE/db) = (dR/db) - (dS/db)
(dR/db) = R *(dV/db) V
Once again, the direct effect of the scandal is measured by V , but now the net effects are b
not necessarily observed in any one dependent variable.  The incumbent may respond to a scandal
by dis-saving, that is:  (dS/db)>0.  These funds can then be used to increase campaign
expenditures and mitigate the electoral effect of the scandal.  Consequently, if a candidate has a
large war chest (or can easily borrow), and if the vote share is responsive to campaign spending,
then the observed effects of a scandal will be masked by compensating incumbent behavior.  This
implies that the electoral effects scandal will be greatest for those incumbents with small war
chests or an inability to borrow.  Finally, the effects of scandals should be evidenced in at least
one of the arguments that enter the candidates’ utility function (vote share or savings), but the
effects can not be inferred from examining only one of these variables.
3.  Intertemporal Utility Maximization
 Once again, substitute and differentiate with respect to b, so that: 
(dV/db) = V *(dE/db) +  V *(dL/db) + V   E L b
(dE/db) = (dR/db) - (dS/db)
(dR/db) = R *(dV/db) + R *(dL/db) V L
As before, the direct effect of the scandal is V ;  however, now there is little hope that this effect b 21
can be estimated directly (for the reasons discussed in example one).  Unfortunately, it is also
impossible to fully characterize the net effects of the scandal.  This is because an incumbent in
trouble will now not only dis-save, but will increase effort in order to increase V and R;  this will
mitigate the observed effects of scandal on V, R and S.  It is possible to describe the net effect of
the scandal on each of the observable variables, but it must be kept in mind that some effect is also
occurring in unobserved effort.  Consequently, the failure to find electoral fall-out from a scandal
is not a puzzle.
The general model also has consequences for inferences about whether campaign
contributions are interested.  In the two vote maximizing models, a scandal can be exploited to
learn the sign of R .  For example, under vote maximization, if (dV/db)>0 and  (dR/db)<0, then V
necessarily, R  <0.    However, under intertemporal utility maximization, the sign of R  is no V V
longer implied in this case, since R *(dL/db)<0.  However, even under utility maximization, if L
both (dV/db)>0 and  (dR/db)>0, then R  >0. V
Example Four:  The Electoral and Financial Effects of Committee Power
Several authors have attempted to measure the value of committee assignments [e.g.,
Bullock (1972) and Fowler, Douglas and Clark (1980)] by examining the incumbent’s share of the
vote.  Such studies implicitly assume that candidates are pure vote maximizers;  any advantage
attributable to committee power is therefore translated into vote share (either directly, or
indirectly through increased campaign receipts and expenditures).
In general, researchers have not been successful in finding any electoral effects of
committee power (see Milyo, 1997b), but several have found that incumbents on powerful22
committees raise more campaign funds  [e.g., Grier and Munger (1991a,b), Romer and Snyder
(1994) and Milyo (1997b, 1998)].  This can be reconciled with vote maximization only if the
electoral effects of campaign spending are negligible, that is V =0. E
Milyo (1998) examines several examples of shocks to the fund-raising ability of
incumbents (e.g., changes in committee assignments and jurisdictions, promotions to leadership
positions, etc.) but finds no corresponding increase in reduced-form estimates of incumbent vote
share;  Milyo concludes from this exercise that the marginal effects of incumbent spending are nil. 
However, this conclusion rest entirely on the assumption of vote-maximizing behavior.  If
incumbents are utility maximizers, then shocks to fund-raising ability may be off-set by a reduction
in vote-getting effort.
Example Five:  Incumbency Advantage
Incumbency advantage has been studied by several authors (e.g., Levitt and Wolfram,
1997);  all of these studies attempt to measure the incumbency advantage in terms of vote share
alone.  If incumbency can be represented as a shock to both vote-getting and fund-raising ability
(a change in a in the model above), then the implications parallel those discussed above.  Existing
studies make sense only in a world of pure vote maximization.  Intertemporal vote maximization
implies that some of the incumbency advantage will be realized in greater savings, while the
general model suggests that some of the advantage will “leak” into an unobserved absence of
effort (leisure).  Consequently, existing estimates of the incumbency advantage probably
underestimate the true effects of incumbency on incumbent welfare.  Further, the observed
increase in the incumbency advantage over time (measured in vote share) may be the consistent23
with a decrease in the true incumbency advantage.  This is because the observed increase in vote
share may be coincident with decreases in incumbent war chests and increases in incumbent effort
over time.  Since all three of these variables (V,S,L) enter the incumbent utility function, it is
possible that the net effect of these changes is a decrease in utility.
6.  An Empirical Application
The 1992 House elections provide an excellent context for applying many of the ideas
presented above.  The 1992 elections are notable for the multiplicity of exogenous shocks to
incumbent welfare.  First, redistricting altered the make-up of many districts, forcing some
incumbents to appeal to a very different set of constituents.  Second, the names of incumbents
involved in the House Bank scandal were made public, as was information on the number of
checks kited.  Finally, the “grandfather clause” (which permitted incumbents elected prior to 1980
to convert excess campaign funds to personal use) expired.
The effects of scandal and redistricting are clear examples of a shock to the incumbent’s
vote-getting ability.  The effects of grandfathering are more complex.  Milyo (1997a)
demonstrates that grandfathered incumbents had a higher marginal cost of raising funds and a
higher marginal benefit of saving funds during the period that this clause was in effect.  The latter
effect is intuitively obvious, while the former stems from the idea that interested contributors are
more likely to donate money to incumbents who have a longer expected attachment to their
office.  Thus the greater incentive to retire among the grandfathered incumbents was a hindrance
to their fund-raising ability.  Consequently, the elimination of this clause in 1992 not only spurred
many incumbents to retire, but also affected those that chose to run rather than retire. 24
Grandfather status in the 1992 elections is therefore coincident with a positive shock to fund-
raising ability and a negative shock to the continuation value of campaign savings, so (all else
constant) grandfathers should raise more funds and dis-save from their war-chests.
I examine the net effects of these three shocks on incumbent vote-share, receipts and
savings.  I estimate reduced-form specifications based on (4.1-2).  In order to control for
unobserved fixed characteristics of incumbents or their districts, I take the first difference of the
dependent variables.  The changes in V, R and S are then functions of changes in the exogenous
variables in the model (a,b,c,x,S ).  Let (da, db, dc, dx) denote the changes in (a,b,c,x) and let -1
(u , u , u  ) denote the reduced-form disturbance terms.  The parameters to be estimated are now V R S
listed in lower case, in order to distinguish them from the structural parameters above. 
Consequently, the equations to be estimated are of the form:
6.1 (V-V ) = constant + v *da + v *db + v *dc + v *dx + v *(S  - S ) + u -1 a b c x S -1 -2 V
6.2 (R-R ) = constant + r *da + r *db + r *dc + r *dx + r *(S  - S ) + u -1 a b c x S -1 -2 R
6.3 (S-S ) = constant + s *da + s *db + s *dc + s *dx + s *(S  - S ) + u -1 a b c x S -1 -2 S
However, the presence of (S  - S ) as an independent variable is problematic;  since all of the -1 -2
lagged dependent variables are functions of period (-1)-specific unobserved effects.  This concern
can be addressed by using S  as an instrumental variable for (S  - S );  this purges the latter -2 -1 -2
variable of any period(-1)-specific variation.
The other control variables used in these regressions are tenure (in years) and indicator
variables for party, freshman status, freshman*party, promotions to leadership positions or25
important committees and promotions*party.  The promotion variable takes the value of one for
any incumbent promoted to a committee chair, party leadership position, or any of the following
committees:  Appropriations, Energy and Commerce, Rules, or Ways and Means.  In general,
minor deviations in the definition or composition of these control variables has some impact on
the point estimates of the variables of interest, but does not alter the overall pattern of results.
The independent variables of interest are two indicator variables for grandfather status and
the presence of major redistricting (defined in Jacobson and Dimock, 1994), and the natural
logarithm of the number of (1+checks kited).  However, since these variables are also known to
be responsible for a large number of exits from Congress (through retirement and primary
defeats), I present estimates for two models.  Model one ignores the issue of sample selection
caused by departures from Congress, while model two corrects for this sample selection bias.  The
correction is accomplished with a standard two stage estimator, where the first stage is a probit
estimation of whether the incumbent exited the sample.  The variables included in the first stage
are all of those in the model one, plus the incumbent’s war chest, war chest*grandfather and the
incumbent’s previous vote share.  The details of this model are of little import, since even in this
unusual case of many departures from Congress, correcting for sample selection bias has little
impact on most of the estimates of interest.
Consider the results reported in Table Two.  Both redistricting and the Bank scandal are
associated with significant decreases in net vote share.  The apparent effect of redistricting is the
only estimate which is very sensitive to the sample selection correction; the 72 incumbents
affected by major redistricting are estimated to have lost almost seven percentage points in model
one, but over sixteen percentage points in model two.  The net electoral effects of the bank26
scandal are less straightforward to calculate.  Two hundred incumbents passed an average of 54
bad checks; the log(54) is approximately equal to four, so an average incumbent involved in the
bank scandal lost about six percentage points of vote share.  However, these net effects on vote
share probably understate the direct effect of either variable.  This is because both variables are
associated with large and significant increases in fund-raising and decreases in the flow of
campaign savings.  These outcomes would be difficult to understand under the assumption of vote
maximization;  one would be forced to conclude that campaign contributions are strongly
partisan, so that a large negative shock to incumbent vote share is met with a flood of campaign
contributions to the incumbent.  However, these results are quite consistent with the idea that
incumbents crank up their effort in adverse circumstances.
The estimates for grandfathers are particularly intriguing.  Grandfathers realized significant
increases in receipts and dis-saved, consistent with the hypothesized effects of the elimination of
the grand-father clause.  However, the increase in campaign spending by these incumbents (over
$150,000) did not result in any significant increase in vote share.  Under the assumption of vote-
maximization, this implies that marginal incumbent campaign expenditures have no effect on
incumbent vote shares, as argued in Milyo (1998).  However, this outcome is also consistent with
the notion that grandfathers compensated for their increased fund-raisng and spending by enjoying
more leisure.  Thus the interpretation of these estimates (and hence our understanding of the
dynamics of campaign finance) is completely driven by the behavioral assumption.
7.  Discussion27
A persistent shortcoming of the literature on Congressional elections and campaign
finance has been the absence of explicit assumptions about candidate behavior.  Empirical models
are typically ad hoc, or poorly motivated.  The model presented here provides a simple framework
for specifying both structural and reduced form equations that have a basis in rational maximizing
behavior.
One implication of this approach is that challenger quality (expenditure) is not exogenous
to incumbent vote share;  therefore measures of challenger quality (expenditure) should not
appear in reduced-form specifications of the incumbent’s vote share or campaign finances. 
Further, reduced-form specifications of this sort should include as independent variables all
exogenous determinants of: 1) incumbent vote share, 2) incumbent and challenger campaign
finances 3) and the quality of the challenger.  These lessons apply even when candidates are
modeled as simple vote maximizers. 
A second implication is that the presence of unobserved and endogenous effort confounds
structural estimation of candidate vote shares and campaign finances.  For example, all potential
instruments for campaign spending are shown, by construction, to also be determinants of
incumbent effort.  This makes the search for some plausible measure of candidate effort a top
priority for the study of Congressional elections.
The final implication is that great caution must be observed in making inferences about the
importance of institutions or events based upon reduced-form estimates of candidate vote share or
campaign finances.  First, candidate utility is a function of electoral security, campaign savings and
effort, so the effects of a shock to vote-getting or fund-raising may not be realized in a single
variable.  Second, the failure to observe incumbent effort means that the effects of a shock may be28
either masked, or not observed at all.  Again, if a proxy for effort existed, then researchers would
have the ability to make inferences about the electoral or financial effects of legislative institutions
or events.29
Bibliography
Ansolabehere, Stephen and James Snyder (1996).  “Money, Elections, and Candidate Quality,”
presented at the annual meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, IL
(April 1996)
Banks, Jeffrey and D. Roderick Kiewiet (1989).  “Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition
in Congressional Elections,” American Journal of Political Science, 33(4): 997-1015.
Bender, Bruce and John Lott (1996).  “Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the
Literature,” Public Choice, 87: 67-100.
Bullock, Charles.  (1972).  “Freshman Committee Assignments and Re-Election in the United
States House of Representatives,” American Political Science Review, 66: 996-1008.
Crain, Mark and John Sullivan (1997).  “Committee Characteristics and Re-Election Margins:  An
Empirical Investigation of the U.S. House,” Public Choice, 93: 271-285.
Erickson, Robert and Thomas Palfrey (1998).  “Campaign Spending and Incumbency: An
Alternative Simultaneous Equations Approach,” Journal of Politics, 60(2): 355-373.
Fenno, Richard (1978).  Home Style: House Members and Their Districts.  Scott, Foresman and
Company (Glenview, IL).
Figlio, David (1995).  “The Effect of Retirement on Political Shirking: Evidence from
Congressional Voting,” Public Finance Quarterly, 23(2): 226-241.
Fowler, Linda, Scott Douglass and Wesley Clark (1980).  The Electoral Effects of House
Committee Assignments,” Journal of Politics, 42: 307-319.
Gerber, Alan (1998).  “Campaign Spending and Election Outcomes: Re-estimating the Effects of
Campaign Spending,” American Journal of Political Science, 42(2): 401-411.
Green, Donald and Jonathan Krasno (1988).  “Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent:
Reestimating Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections,” American Journal of Political
Science, 32: 884-907.
Grier, Kevin and Michael Munger (1991a).  “Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences,
and Campaign Contributions to House Incumbents,” Economic Inquiry, 29: 24-43.
Grier, Kevin and Michael Munger (1991b).  “The Impact of Legislator Attributes on Interest
Group Campaign Contributions,” Journal of Labor Research, 7: 349-361.30
Groseclose, Tim and Keith Krehbiel (1994).  “Golden Parachutes, Rubber Checks and Strategic
Retirements from the 102  House,” American Journal of Political Science, 38(1): 75-99.
nd
Hall, Richard and Richard Van Houwelling (199x).  “Avarice and Ambition in Congress: 
Representative’ Decisions to Run or Retire from the U.S. House of Representatives,” American
Journal of Political Science, 89(1): 121-136.
Jacobson, Gary (1989).  “Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of House Elections, 1946-1986,”
American Political Science Review, 83(3):  xx-xx.
Jacobson, G. and M. Dimock (1994).  “Checking Out: The Effect of Bank Overdrafts on the 1992
House Elections,” American Journal of Political Science, 38: 601-624.
Levitt, Steven (1994).  “Using Repeat Challengers to Estimate the Effects of Campaign Spending
on Election Outcomes in the U.S. House,” Journal of Political Economy, 102: 777-798.
Levitt, Steven and Catherine Wolfram (1997).  “Decomposing the Sources of Incumbency
Advantage in the U.S. House,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, 22(1): 45-60. 
Mayhew, David (1974).  The Electoral Connection.  Yale University Press (New Haven, CT).
Milyo, Jeffrey (1997a).  “The Economics of Political Campaign Finance: FECA and the Puzzle of
the Not Very Greedy Grandfathers,” Public Choice, 93: 245-270.
Milyo, Jeffrey (1997b).  “The Electoral and Financial Effects of Changes in Committee Power:
GRH, TRA86 and the Money Committees in the U.S. House,” Journal of Law and Economics,
40(1): 93-112.
Milyo, Jeffrey (1998).  The Electoral Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections.  Citizens’
Research Foundation (Los Angeles, CA).
Milyo, Jeffrey and Tim Groseclose (1998).  “The Effects of Incumbent Wealth in House
Elections,” manuscript.
Romer, Thomas and James Snyder (1994).  “An Empirical Investigation into the Dynamics of
PAC Contributions,” American Journal of Political Science, 38: 745-769.
Snyder, James (1990).  “Campaign Contributions as Investments: the U.S. House of
Representatives 1980-1986,” Journal of Political Economy, 98: 1195-1227.
Snyder, James (1992).  “Long-Term Investing in Politicians; or, Give Early, Give Often,” Journal31
of Law and Economics, 35: 15-43.
Table One: Campaign Finances of House Incumbents by Vote Share32
Incumbents Running for Re-Election, 1984-1992
Incumbent Vote Share:
Variable Name (n=1958) (n=1378) (n=421) (n=207) (n=68)
All V<.75 V<.60 V<.55 V<.50
Vote Share .713 .635 .542 .507 .467
(V) (.146) (.075) (.043) (.035) (.031)
Receipts $474,395 529,139 680,443 705,226 725,736
(R) ($294,327) (308,370) (341,355) (300,100) (277,462)
Stock of Savings $140,631 117,139 41,830 18,136 518
(S) ($219,713) (202,500) (149,802) (112,797) (77,071)
Change in Vote .007 -.033 -.089 -.107 -.155
Share (V-V ) (.157) (.134) (.139) (.135) (.154) -1
Change in Receipts $47,441 77,157 189,037 229,258 257,083
(R-R ) ($262,525) (275,869) (325,379) (312,185) (318,919) -1
Flow of Savings $35,128 22,869 -22,834 -30,795 -51,854
(S-S ) ($111,046) (112,074) (108,159) (97,225) (107,450) -1
Notes: All financial variables are measured in constant 1990 dollars.
Table Two: The 1992 House Elections33
All House Incumbents Running for Reelection in 1992;  n=347
Model One: Dependent Variables:
Independent Variables (V-V ) (R-R ) (S-S )
Change in Vote Share Change in Receipts Flow of Savings
-1 -1 -1
Log(1 + Bad Checks) -.015** 25,583** -10,542*
(.005) (8,240) (4,778)
Major Redistricting -.067** 203,213** -33,218
[72] (.023) (35,111) (20,361)
Grandfathers .003 102,166* -67,336*
[112] (.032) (50,784) (29,449)
Corrected for no no no
Selection Bias from
Retirements
Model Two: Dependent Variables:
Independent Variables (V-V ) (R-R ) (S-S )
Change in Vote Share Change in Receipts Flow of Savings
-1 -1 -1
Log(1 + Bad Checks) -.014* 25,442** -10,484*
(.007) (7,825) (5,196)
Major Redistricting -.162** 231,354** -44,847
[72] (.035) (55,192) (24,899)
Grandfathers .034 102,362 -67,417
[112] (.050) (58,927) (35,858)
Corrected for yes yes yes
Selection Bias from
Retirements
Notes: ** (p<.01), *(p<.05);  standard errors are heteroscedatsic-consistent (White’s method).  
All regression include controls for party, promotions, freshman status, tenure and the
(instrumented) change in (S -S );  see the text for further details. -1 -2